In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today.
University of Queensland, Australia - ORCID: 0000-0001-5707-7605
University of Queensland, Australia - ORCID: 0000-0002-1150-3848
Chapter Title
Foundations of Human and Animal Sensory Awareness: Descartes and Willis
Authors
Deborah Brown, Brian Key
Language
English
DOI
10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8.06
Peer Reviewed
Publication Year
2023
Copyright Information
© 2023 Author(s)
Content License
Metadata License
Book Title
Reading Descartes
Book Subtitle
Consciousness, Body, and Reasoning
Editors
Andrea Strazzoni, Marco Sgarbi
Peer Reviewed
Number of Pages
206
Publication Year
2023
Copyright Information
© 2023 Author(s)
Content License
Metadata License
Publisher Name
Firenze University Press
DOI
10.36253/979-12-215-0169-8
ISBN Print
979-12-215-0168-1
eISBN (pdf)
979-12-215-0169-8
eISBN (epub)
979-12-215-0170-4
Series Title
Knowledge and its Histories